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I.  
 
 
 
 
 
Essay I 
 
The Impact of Marketing Strategy  
Information on the Producer’s Selling Decision 
 
Introduction 
 
Agricultural economists have supplied the agricultural industry with many studies 
regarding the price forecasting and marketing strategies of producers.  Nearly all of these 
studies take a normative approach to the topic and attempt to derive an “optimal” 
marketing strategy for producers to follow.  However, recent studies indicate that 
producers seldom follow the price forecasting and marketing strategy recommendations 
suggested by agricultural economists (Brorsen and Irwin; Musser, Patrick, and Eckman; 
McNew and Musser).  Producers tend to avoid the complex pricing models that 
researchers provide and prefer more simplistic forecasting methods (Anderson and 
Mapp).  This lack of use by producers suggests that the price forecasting and marketing 
strategy information being supplied to producers is not reflective of their actual 
marketing decisions. 
In order to provide producers with more relevant marketing information, we must 
ask what sources of marketing strategy information actually influence the producers’ 
marketing decisions?  The majority of research on the market information used by 
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producers focuses on results from producer surveys (Patrick and Ullerich; Batte, 
Schnitkey, and Jones; Ortmann et al.).  These surveys indicate that producers consider 
private consultants, such as market advisory services1, a highly important source of 
marketing information.  For example, Patrick and Ullerich’s study of 17 marketing 
information sources reported that market advisory services were outranked only by past 
farm records.  In a study by Schroeder et al. a sample of Kansas farmers rank market 
advisory services as the number one source of information for developing price 
expectations.  
While these surveys reveal the information sources producers say they use, there 
is limited empirical research on whether producers actually follow market advisory 
service recommendations in their marketing decisions.  Survey responses by Pennings, 
Irwin, and Good and Isengildina et al. suggest few producers closely follow the specific 
pricing recommendations of market advisory services.  Instead, producers generally use 
market advisory services for background information, comparing it with other 
information sources in order to make a decision (Pennings, Irwin, and Good; Isengildina 
et al.).  One reason that producers do not closely follow these recommendations may be 
the low pricing performance shown by market advisory services.  The average revenue 
achieved by following market advisory service recommendations for corn and soybeans 
is only slightly above the benchmark average (Irwin, Martines-Filho, and Good), while 
the average revenue achieved for wheat is well below the benchmark average (Martines-
Filho, Good, and Irwin). 
                                                 
1 For a subscription fee advisory services help farmers with their marketing decisions by providing 
marketing information, analysis and recommendations.  See Isengildina et al. for a complete review of the 
market advisory service industry.  
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Zulauf and Irwin suggested using the local cash price basis (futures-cash) as a 
marketing signal and found that storing when the basis is larger than storage costs can be 
a favorable marketing strategy, given that a short futures hedge is placed at harvest.  
Additional research on the accuracy of price forecasting models reveals that forecasts 
based on econometric models generally do no better than forecasts based on futures 
markets (Tomek) and may even be outperformed by futures markets for certain 
commodities (Kastens and Schroeder). 
Matwichuk found a positive relationship between the market sentiment of market 
advisory services and past commodity returns, suggesting that market advisory services 
are trend followers.  Trend followers make marketing decisions based on technical rather 
than fundamental information (Sanders et al.).  The question now is, “Do producers 
prefer marketing strategies based on mainly technical information, such as market 
advisory service recommendations, or do they prefer more fundamental strategies, such 
as changes in expected returns to storage?”  Thus, the objective of this research is to 
determine how wheat producers’ selling decisions correspond with market advisory 
service recommendations and changes in expected returns.  In order to satisfy this 
objective, a Tobit regression model will be used to evaluate the effect of market advisory 
service recommendations and futures price spreads on the number of wheat sales that 
occur on a given day for a sample of Oklahoma wheat producers. 
The majority of past research on producer marketing information consists of 
producer surveys that report which information sources producers say they use.  
However, it is possible that producers do not act in the way that they say they act.  
Studies on behavioral finance find that people are prone to psychological biases when 
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making marketing decisions (Brorsen and Anderson, 2001; Kahneman and Riepe).  
Examples of psychological biases include overconfidence in one’s ability to predict the 
market and the tendency to remember successes and forget failures, known as hindsight 
bias.  Individuals typically are not aware that they have these biases.  Thus, research 
based on producer surveys may not accurately reflect the marketing strategy needs of 
producers.  This study goes beyond producer surveys by using actual producer 
transactions to obtain a more precise estimate of the relative importance in producer 
decisions of market advisory service recommendations and fundamental information as 
represented by futures market spreads. 
 
Theory 
There is no shortage of literature regarding the price of storage and the optimal 
marketing strategy that crop producers should follow (e.g. Working; Williams and 
Wright; Fackler and Livingston; Zulauf and Irwin).  The theory of the price of storage 
explains inter-temporal price relationships between spot and futures with regards to the 
cost of carrying a particular commodity.  It takes into account the interest foregone in 
storing a commodity (opportunity cost of storage), the physical cost of storage (including 
a risk premium), and the convenience yield for holding stocks (Working; Fama and 
French; Yoon and Brorsen).  Thus, the price of storage, or the basis, is defined as:  
(1) TtTtTtttTt CWRSSF ,,,, −+=−  
where Ft,T is the futures price at time t for delivery of a commodity at time T, St is the 
spot price at time t, Rt,T is the interest foregone during storage (opportunity cost), Wt,T is 
the marginal physical cost of storage (e.g. storage rent, handling costs, insurance, 
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transport, etc.), and Ct,T is the marginal convenience yield.  The price of storage, 
tTt SF −, , can also be interpreted as the return from purchasing the commodity at t and 
selling it for delivery at T; this is the return to storage from time period t to T (t < T ).   
The convenience yield, as defined by Working, refers to the implicit benefits that 
accrue to the owner of a physical stock but not to the owner of a contract for future 
delivery.  For example, a convenience yield may exist from holding stores of some 
commodities, such as wheat, because they are inputs in the production of other 
commodities, such as flour.  Stockholders may also earn a convenience yield by being 
able to respond efficiently to unexpected changes in supply and demand.  The theory of 
storage predicts an inverse relationship between convenience yields and inventories 
(Fama and French); therefore, the benefits for producers are greater when inventories are 
small.  When millers, exporters, foreign countries, etc. have a high convenience yield 
returns to storage will be low and there will be less incentive for producers to continue to 
store their crop (Yoon and Brorsen). 
A basic farmer marketing strategy is to continue to store as long as the expected 
marginal returns from storage are greater than the expected marginal costs of storage.  
Fackler and Livingston argue that this basic strategy is too simplistic for crop producers 
because it assumes that stocks can easily be replenished during the marketing year.  Due 
to the fact that a sale out of storage is an irreversible action for a crop producer, they 
propose a marketing strategy that still involves storing at low prices and selling at high 
prices but with a cutoff price function marking the boundary between low and high 
prices.  Thus, producers would sell if the current expected returns to storage exceed the 
maximum expected future returns to storage, 
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(2) ])[(max])[( ,1,1,1,1,1, TtTtTtTtTtttttttt WRSSFEWRSSFE +++++ +−−>+−−  
where ])[( tttttt WRSSFE +−−  is the expected net returns from selling at the present 
time t and ])[(max ,1,1,1,1,1 TtTtTtTtTtt WRSSFE +++++ +−−  are the maximum future returns to 
storage expected at any future date.  Returns to storage are not the only factor in the 
producer’s marketing strategy.  Government programs and producers’ individual cash 
flows and taxes could also play a role.  For example, if a producer’s storage cost is low 
government loan programs may encourage continued storage by allowing the producer to 
retain the real option value implicit in a loan program (Yoon and Brorsen).  Producers 
may time their selling decisions with their need for cash inflows to make loan payments 
or cover production expenses.  They might also hold off selling until after the first of the 
year in order to reduce their income tax.   
Zulauf and Irwin found that the most successful strategies were those that used 
the futures market as a source of information.  The marketing strategy they suggest is to 
base storage decisions on whether the current futures-cash basis (expected return to 
storage) exceeds the expected cost of storing and use hedging to increase the chances of 
acquiring the expected return.  In the current study few producers likely use hedging in 
their marketing decisions.  Considering that hedging only increased the statistical power 
of Zulauf and Irwin’s tests, rather than increased the expected returns, their arguments 
still apply even though producers were not using futures.   
An important element of equation (2) is that producers must form expectations 
about the returns to storage.  Agricultural economists typically assume that producers 
form rational expectations.  This assumption implies that producers use all available 
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market information to make rational decisions.  Producers may use fundamental 
information, such as changes in futures prices, or technical information, such as price 
trends, to make their marketing decisions.  Research indicates that technical analysis, in 
the form of trend following, yielded small profits in the 1970s and 1980s (Covel; Lukac 
and Brorsen) but not in the 1990s (Park and Irwin).  Market advisory services and 
sentiment indices have been found to follow price trends in the manner of positive 
feedback traders, meaning that they recommend holding when prices increase 
(Matwichuk, Sanders et al.).  Producers, on the other hand, are typically thought to be 
negative feedback traders, selling after prices increase (Brorsen and Anderson, 2002; 
Sanders et al.).  Aside from fundamental and technical strategies, producers could base 
their marketing decisions on non-information, known as noise trading (Black), or they 
could use mechanical marketing strategies that involve selling at the same time every 
year regardless of the market (i.e. selling at harvest).  The point is that in order to better 
understand producers’ marketing strategies we must first understand how producers form 
price expectations.  
 
Data 
Data are from three grain elevators located in the northern, southern, and central 
areas of western Oklahoma.  The data span nine crop years, from the harvest of 1992 
through the harvest of 2000, and contain individual producer transactions of wheat sales 
at each elevator.  Information about each sale includes the number of bushels sold, price 
per bushel, and date of transaction.  Sales decrease as the number of weeks after harvest 
increase.  We attempt to measure this deviation around annual seasonal patterns of sales 
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by including the number of weeks after harvest that the sale occurred.  Harvest is a four-
week period that differs for each elevator depending on location.  Beginning harvest dates 
for the southern, central, and northern elevators are May 25, June 1, and June 12 
respectively.   
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for each elevator.  The southern elevator 
has the highest price, lowest average number of weeks, and the highest percentage of 
harvest sales.  According to Benirschka and Binkley, locations closer to the market 
typically have lower returns to storage than locations further away from the market.  
Therefore, southern producers are more likely to sell at or close to harvest which results 
in a lower average number of weeks after harvest compared to the central and northern 
elevators.  The higher average price at the southern elevator is likely due to the fact that 
the southern elevator is closer to the market, and thus transportation costs are lower.  
Therefore, the average price is higher at the southern elevator.  Another reason for the 
higher average price could be that harvest is slightly earlier at the southern elevator 
providing the potential to sell wheat before prices reach harvest lows. 
Table I-1  Descriptive Statistics for Each Elevator 
Descriptive Statistics  South Central North 
Average price ($/bu.)  3.41 3.32 3.39 
Average week after harvest  5 16 18 
Percent harvest sales  58% 19% 14% 
Number of observations  14434 7089 6389 
 
In addition to the elevator data, wheat market advisory service recommendations 
were obtained from the Agricultural Market Advisory Service (AgMAS) Project at the 
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University of Illinois.  The data contain daily selling recommendations from 34 market 
advisory services.  Each recommendation consists of the percentage of stored crop to be 
sold on a given day in a given year, spanning the crop years of 1995-1999.  Market 
advisory services offer “blanket” recommendations to farmers, meaning that the selling 
recommendation for a given day is typically not reflective of individual producer 
location.  Producers in Oklahoma receive the same recommendation as producers in 
Illinois.  For the purpose of this study we will use the average daily sales 
recommendations for the 34 advisory services.  Since the market advisory service sales 
recommendations are represented as a cumulative percentage, the difference between the 
previous day and the following day was calculated, giving us daily recommended sales.  
This is the value that is used to represent market advisory service recommendations.  The 
elevator data does not contain information on producers’ pre-harvest marketing 
strategies, though the number of forward contracts should be relatively small.  Therefore, 
the study does not consider pre-harvest sales recommendations which may account for as 
much as 50% of the market advisory service recommendations.    
Futures spreads are used to represent the expected returns to storage and are 
calculated based on Kansas City futures prices.  Wheat futures contracts are sold in 
March, May, July, September, and December.  Oklahoma producers do not typically 
store their wheat for long periods of time, therefore, only the nearby and distant futures 
price spreads are used.  The nearby spread is the futures spread that is nearest to the date 
of the given transactions, and the distant spread is the futures spread that is second 
nearest to the given transaction date.  For example, the nearby spread for a transaction 
with a date of July 5 for a given year would be the difference between the December 5th 
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futures price and the September 5th futures price for the given crop year.  The distant 
spread for the same transaction would be the difference between the January 5th futures 
price and the December 5th futures price for the given crop year.  Due to the fact that 
futures contracts are bought and sold only during certain months, a cutoff date to 
distinguish between the selling and delivery timeframe for those months had to be 
established.  The cutoff date was set at the 20th of the month prior to each contract month 
(March, May, July, September, and December).  Since all the spreads do not cover the 
same number of months, they were divided by the number of days in each price spread.  
For example, the May-July spread contains two months and the December-March spread 
consists of three months, so the price spreads were divided by the number of days in each 
spread, 61 and 90, respectively (ignoring leap years). 
Before using the data certain modifications had to be performed.  First, the 1998 
crop year is not included in the data at the northern elevator due to missing producer 
transaction information.  Secondly, the last two weeks in May for every year were deleted 
from the dataset for the southern elevator and the first two weeks in June for every year 
were deleted from the dataset for the northern elevator.  This is due to the fact that the 
market advisory service data always assumed that the crop year began on June 1 and 
ended on May 31 of the following year.  While the harvest date at the central elevator 
coincides with this assumption, the southern elevator’s harvest is earlier in the season and 
the northern elevator’s harvest is later in the season.  Therefore, in order for the market 
advisory service recommendations to correctly correspond with the elevator transactions 
the aforementioned dates were deleted for the southern and northern elevators. 
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Procedure 
The following regression model is estimated for each elevator to determine how 
producers’ selling decisions correspond with market advisory service recommendations 
and expected returns to storage: 
(3) iktiktikt
y
tkiiktiktytyikt wahwahmasdistnearcyws εβββββββ +++++++= ∑
=
−
2
65
8
1
,1,43210  
where wsikt is the number of wheat sales that occurred at the ith elevator on the kth day in 
year t, cyt is a yearly dummy variable to adjust for differences in price across years, 
nearikt is the nearby futures spread, distikt is the distant futures spread, masi,k-1,t is the 
lagged average percent of the crop that market advisory services recommended selling on 
that date2, wahikt is the number of weeks after harvest that the transaction occurred, 
2
iktwah  is the non-linear term for number of weeks after harvest, and iktε  is the error term 
such that ),0(~ 2itit N σε .  The error term is expected to be heteroskedastic with the 
following variance equation: 
(4) )exp( 2210
2
iktiktikt wahwah ααασ ++= . 
Due to the fact that the dependent variable can take on a value of zero when no 
transactions occur, a Tobit regression will be used to estimate the truncated model.  
Therefore, it allows the dependent variable to reflect when no sales take place.  The Tobit 
regression procedure assumes normality which is not the case in our model.  A square 
root transformation on the dependent variable was done to induce normality.  The square 
                                                 
2 A non-lagged market advisory service variable was considered, but was not found to be significant.  
Examination of the cross-correlation between the residuals of the dependent variable and the market 
advisory service variable led to the conclusion that the variable should be lagged by one day.  This seems 
reasonable since it could take a day for farmers to receive the information.   
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root transformation is the standard transformation used with count data.  The model is 
estimated using maximum likelihood.  
As previously discussed, producers will sell if the current expected returns to 
storage are greater than the maximum expected future returns to storage.  As the expected 
future returns to storage increase, producers are expected to continue storing and fewer 
wheat sales will take place.  Thus, 2β  and 3β are expected to be negative.  Since 
producer surveys indicate that a large number of producers report using market advisory 
service recommendations, the number of wheat sales is expected to increase with the 
market advisory services’ daily selling recommendations, so 4β is expected to be 
positive.  As mentioned before, Oklahoma wheat producers typically sell the majority of 
their crop at or close to harvest.  Therefore, as weeks after harvest increase we expect to 
observe fewer transactions and coefficients 5β  and 6β  are expected to be negative and 
positive, respectively.   
 
Results 
Tables I-2, I-3, and I-4 show the results of the Tobit regression of expected 
returns to storage (futures price spreads) and market advisory service recommendations 
on number of wheat sales at the northern, central and southern elevators. As expected the 
variables representing the nearby and distant futures price spreads were negatively related 
with the number of wheat sales at all three locations.  Thus, when spreads are high, 
producers are less likely to sell and more inclined to continue to store their wheat.   
 
 13
Table I-2.  Regression of Market Information on Wheat Sales for Northern Elevator  
 Estimate t-value  Pr > t  
Intercept .4646 3.59 .0003 
1996 crop year .7137 6.27 <.0001 
1997 crop year 2.9020 20.02 <.0001 
1999 crop year 2.7635 17.83 <.0001 
Nearby Futures Spread (near) -2.4808**a -8.69 <.0001 
Distant Futures Spread (dist) -2.8721** -9.25 <.0001 
Market Advisory Service Recommendation (mas) -.0579* -1.87 .0615 
Weeks after harvest (wah) -.0965** -7.66 <.0001 
Weeks after harvest squared (wah2) .0015** 5.45 <.0001 
a One asterisk indicates significance at the 90% level and two asterisks indicates 
significance at the 95% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I-3.  Regression of Market Information on Wheat Sales for Central Elevator  
 Estimate t-value  Pr > t  
Intercept 1.8567 14.41 <.0001 
1996 crop year -.2420 -2.29 .0218 
1997 crop year .4529 2.59 .0095 
1998 crop year .7074 3.86 .001 
1999 crop year .3062 1.61 .1080 
Nearby Futures Spread (near) -.8778**a -3.38 .0007 
Distant Futures Spread (dist) -.8909** -2.80 .0050 
Market Advisory Service Recommendation (mas) .0203 .87 .3838 
Weeks after harvest (wah) -.0624** -5.95 <.0001 
Weeks after harvest squared (wah2) .0008** 3.54 .0004 
a Two asterisks indicates significance at the 95% level. 
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Table I-4.  Regression of Market Information on Wheat Sales for Southern Elevator  
 Estimate t-value  Pr > t  
Intercept 2.9586 9.76 <.0001 
1996 crop year .0399 .16 .8727 
1997 crop year 1.4263 3.61 .0003 
1998 crop year .5075 1.20 .2299 
1999 crop year .5795 1.33 .1840 
Nearby Futures Spread (near) -1.7803**a -2.99 .0028 
Distant Futures Spread (dist) -.3412 -.46 .6461 
Market Advisory Service Recommendation (mas) -.1372** -2.40 .0165 
Weeks after harvest (wah) -.2910** -11.71 <.0001 
Weeks after harvest squared (wah2) .0046** 9.21 <.0001 
a Two asterisks indicates significance at the 95% level. 
 
The nearby spreads were found to be significant at the 95% confidence level for all three 
elevators, while the distant futures spread was only significant at the northern and central 
elevators.  Since the southern elevator is one of the first to harvest wheat, most southern 
producers sell immediately before prices reach harvest lows.  Also, the returns to storage 
tend to increase as location moves further away from the market (Benirschka and 
Binkley). Therefore, more long-term storage is expected to occur at the central and 
northern elevators and could explain why the distant futures spread increases in 
significance as elevator location moves northward.  These results indicate that producers 
are using expected returns to storage as part of their selling decision.  This is consistent 
with a marketing strategy that uses fundamental analysis, such as using futures spreads to 
calculate expected returns to storage, and suggests that producers may, at least partly, 
base price expectations and storage decisions on fundamental information. 
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The regression further indicated that the market advisory service recommendation 
variable did not have the expected positive sign across all elevators.  The sign was only 
positive at the central elevator.  However, it was not statistically significant, signifying 
that market advisory service recommendations have no affect on producers’ selling 
decisions at the central elevator. Market advisory service recommendations exhibited an 
inverse relationship at the southern and northern elevators where it was significant at the 
95% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively.  These results suggest that producers are 
not following the recommendations of market advisory services.  Instead, they are doing 
the opposite of what the advisory services recommend.  Market advisory services have 
been found to be positive feedback traders, holding when prices rise and selling when 
prices fall (Matwichuk; Sanders et al.), while producers have been found to be negative 
feedback traders, holding when prices fall and selling when prices rise (Brorsen and 
Anderson, 2002).  Thus, producers are likely unknowingly making marketing decisions in 
opposite directions of market advisory service recommendations.  This negative 
relationship indicates that most producers do not directly implement strategies based on 
technical information into their marketing decisions.   
Table I-5 shows the elasticity of the nearby and distant spread variables as well as 
the market advisory service recommendation variable at each elevator. 
Table I-5.  The Elasticity of Selected Variables at Each Elevator 
 South Central North 
Nearby Futures Spread (near) -.0546 -.0456 -.2974 
Distant Futures Spread (dist) -.0339 -.0723 -.1891 
Market Advisory Service Recommendation (mas) -.0034 .0055 - .0228 
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Due to the nature of the Tobit regression model the elasticity of the variables is not equal 
to the beta coefficients and must be calculated separately3.  As can be seen from table I-5, 
the elasticities do exhibit the same signs as the coefficients in the regression model.  
Thus, the relationship between the dependent variable and the variables in table I-5 are 
the same as discussed previously.  However, we can see that the effect of a change in the 
future spread variables is fairly small at the southern and central elevator, while the 
northern elevator shows a greater change in the number of wheat sales with regards to 
changes in the nearby and distant spreads.  As the nearby and distant spreads increase the 
number of wheat sales at the northern elevator will decrease by 30% and 19%, 
respectively.  A change in the market advisory service recommendations has little effect 
on the number of wheat sales at all three elevators, indicating once again that Oklahoma 
wheat producers do not seem to be following the recommendations of market advisory 
services. 
The variables measuring number of weeks after harvest are statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level and exhibit the expected signs across all three elevators 
indicating that as the number of weeks after harvest increase fewer wheat sales take 
place.  This is consistent with the theory that Oklahoma wheat producers typically sell the 
majority of their crop at or close to harvest (Cunningham, Brorsen, and Anderson).   
Conclusion 
This paper determined whether Oklahoma wheat producers’ market timing 
decisions were correlated with fundamental (expected returns) or technical (market 
advisory service recommendations) information.  The results indicate that producers are 
                                                 
3 The elasticities were calculated at the four-week harvest mean.  For a thorough decomposition of the 
Tobit model with regards to elasticity see McDonald and Moffit. 
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responding to fundamental information in the form of futures spreads that provide 
expected returns to storage. Producers’ decisions were negatively related to market 
advisory service recommendations.  Apparently, producers typically make selling 
decisions that are opposite of those of trend followers.  Producers normally sell when 
prices rise, while trend followers hold when prices rise in the hope that they will rise even 
further.  Since market advisory services have been found to be trend followers, their 
recommendations do not match the marketing decisions made by producers.  Therefore, 
despite survey results showing that producers say they view market advisory service 
recommendations as very important to their marketing decisions, Oklahoma wheat 
producers do not closely follow the recommendations.  It is more likely that producers 
only use market advisory service recommendations as background information, 
comparing it with other information sources in order to make marketing decisions.   
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II.  
 
 
 
 
 
Essay II 
 
Determining Returns to Storage:   
USDA Data versus Micro Level Data 
 
Introduction 
 
Agricultural economists typically use aggregate data from the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) instead of micro level data when conducting research 
on returns to storage (Hagedorn and Irwin; Brorsen and Irwin).  This is mainly attributed 
to the fact that micro level data can be difficult to obtain and can be costly in both time 
and money.  However, concerns about using USDA data in research regarding returns to 
storage do exist.  One concern is the potential for information loss during the aggregation 
process that may ultimately result in underestimating the returns to storage.  Another 
concern about using USDA data relates to the method used to collect the data.  The 
USDA relies mainly on surveys of elevators for information regarding prices received, 
bushels produced and sold, and sale dates.  Elevator managers typically give the surveys 
to their bookkeepers, who are responsible for filling out the surveys.  It is possible that 
the bookkeepers do not supply accurate information on the surveys.  For example, they 
may report an average or rounded price instead of an exact price or they may give a 
rough estimate of the number of bushels sold or produced.  Thus, using USDA data as 
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opposed to actual elevator data could result in inaccurate research conclusions, such as 
underestimating the returns to storage.  A need for research that compares USDA 
calculated returns with returns based on micro level data exists.  
The prices received by producers decline as distance to the market increases due 
to the increase in transportation costs.  Because the price at the closer location is higher 
than that at the further location, the opportunity cost of storing is also higher at the closer 
location.  Thus, storage costs at two elevators that are identical expect for location will 
differ (Benirschka and Binkely).  Given that the opportunity cost of storing does decline 
as the distance to the market increases, Benirschka and Binkley found that locations 
farther from the market have a slight advantage in commodity storage.  In other words, 
locations farther from the market enjoy slightly higher returns to storage due to decreased 
opportunity costs than locations closer to the market.  Wright and Williams found that 
commodities stored in two locations must be treated as two different commodities due to 
the marginal costs of transforming one commodity into the other.  In this case the 
transformation cost would be the cost of transporting the commodity at the further 
elevator to the closer elevator.  Thus, aggregating the two elevators without accounting 
for the lower opportunity cost of storing at the further location may cause the returns to 
storage to be underestimated. 
Farmer marketing strategies are an important part of the farm management 
process and have been researched extensively throughout the years (i.e. Musser, Patrick, 
and Eckman; Zulauf and Irwin; Schroeder et al.).  Researchers typically agree with the 
efficient market hypothesis that suggests that little profit can be made from trying to beat 
the market.  Instead, farmers will receive an average price over the crop year.  However, 
 23
a recent view on farmer marketing decisions is that farmers actually do worse than 
average.  The research on producer performance is limited to a few studies with different 
results.  Hagedorn and Irwin found that farmers do tend to under perform the market; 
while a study by Brorsen and Anderson found that farmers perform above the market 
average.  An important difference in these two studies is the data used by the researchers.  
Hagedorn and Irwin used USDA data and Brorsen and Anderson used micro level 
elevator data.  Further, the lower farmer returns found by Hagedorn and Irwin are due 
primarily to farmers storing too long.  If USDA data is indeed limited by the 
aforementioned concerns, then the study by Hagedorn and Irwin may have 
underestimated the returns farmers received and underestimated their marketing abilities.   
So the question remains, “How much does using USDA data underestimate 
returns to storage”?  The objective of this study is to determine how much lower returns 
to storage based on USDA data are compared to returns based on micro level data.  This 
will be accomplished by comparing Oklahoma Department of Agriculture data with rare 
micro level data obtained from three Oklahoma elevators.  The accuracy of the 
aggregation method will be tested along with comparing the returns to storage computed 
for each dataset.  The Oklahoma wheat market provides a strong test of aggregate data 
because of the significant price differences within the state.  Seasonality of wheat sales 
will also be addressed in order to determine if producers are making inefficient marketing 
decisions by continuing to store after prices have peaked.     
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Theory 
In a geographically dispersed market commodity prices decrease as distance to 
the market increases because of the increase in transportation costs.  As mentioned in the 
introduction, the opportunity cost of storing also decreases as distance increases, which 
results in producers further from the market receiving higher returns to storage.  Due to 
this observation, Benirschka and Binkley suggest that commodities stored at two different 
locations be treated as two different commodities.  Aggregation of the commodities may 
result in a loss of information, creating a biased dataset that underestimates the returns to 
storage. 
In order to further understand how the aggregation of data could create biasness, 
imagine a geographically dispersed market consisting of two time periods where location 
A is closer to the market than location B.  As can be seen from table II-1, the price at the 
closer location A is higher than that at the further location B for both time periods.  This 
is due to the lower cost of transportation at the closer location.  Assuming an interest cost 
of 5% and storage cost of $0.10 at both locations, the nominal and net returns to storage 
at location A are $0.20 and -$0.04 respectively.  The nominal and net returns to storage at 
location B are $0.30 and $0.05, respectively.  Location B exhibits higher returns to 
storage than location A.  This is consistent with the belief that returns to storage increase 
as distance from the market increases.  Now imagine that the data are aggregated and all 
of location A sold in period one and all of location B sold in period two.  The aggregate 
price will be $3.20 in period one and $3.30 in period two and the nominal and net returns 
to storage are $0.10 and - $0.16, respectively.  Thus, aggregating the data resulted in 
lower returns to storage than the disaggregated data and reported negative net returns 
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even though the net returns at location B are positive.  The example demonstrates how 
using aggregate data may lead researchers to underestimate the returns to storage.   
Table II-1.  Example of Aggregation Bias in Geographically Dispersed Market 
 Period 
One 
Price 
Period 
Two 
Price 
Interest 
@ 5% 
Storage
Costs 
Net Price 
for Period 
Two 
Net Returns 
to Storage 
Location A 3.20 3.50 0.16 0.10 3.24 -0.04 
Location B 3.00 3.30 0.15 0.10 3.05 0.05 
Aggregate 3.20 3.30 0.16 0.10 3.04 -0.16 
 
Data and Procedures 
The micro level data for this study come from three elevators located in the 
southern, central, and northern regions of western Oklahoma.  The data span nine crop 
years, from the spring of 1992 through the spring of 20014, and contain transactions of 
individual producer wheat sales at each elevator.  Each transaction includes the number 
of bushels sold, the nominal price received per bushel, and the date of the sale.  Harvest is 
a three-week period with beginning and ending dates that vary by elevator as well as by 
year.  The harvest start date was determined by reviewing the daily transactions that 
occurred around the end of May or beginning of June.  The date when the number of 
bushels sold increased noticeably and stayed relatively high for an extended period of 
time was used as the beginning harvest date.  The southern elevator5 has an earlier 
harvest that typically begins around the end of May.  Harvest at the central and northern 
elevators is slightly later, beginning around the first of June and the middle of June, 
respectively.   
                                                 
4 Due to missing transactions at the northern elevator, the 1998 crop year was deleted from all datasets. 
5 Errors in the southern elevator data were found and removed; thus, the data quality for this elevator is not 
as good as the other two elevators. 
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The returns to storage will be calculated with elevator data and with USDA 
aggregate data obtained from the Oklahoma Department of Agriculture.  The aggregate 
data span from the harvest of 1992 through the harvest of 2000 and contain statewide 
monthly average wheat production statistics.  These statistics include the price received, 
total number of bushels produced, and the percent of wheat sold each month.  Average 
number of bushels sold each month was calculated by multiplying the number of bushels 
produced by the percent sold each month.  Since the USDA data contain only monthly 
averages, harvest is assumed to be the month of June. 
Table II-2 contains descriptive statistics for each elevator, as well as the USDA 
data.  Average price received is the average nominal price producers received over the 
Table -II-2.  Descriptive Statistics for Elevator Data and United States Department 
of Agriculture Data 
 
Descriptive Statistics  South Central North USDA 
Average price received ($/bu.)  3.41 3.32 3.38 3.30 
Harvest price ($/bu.)  3.38 3.25 3.36 3.28 
Percent harvest sales  53.21% 17.31% 13.05% 24% 
Average bushels sold at harvest  961 1728 1770 18,825 
Number of observations  14470 7089 6389 108 
Average beginning harvest date a  May 25 June 3 June 11 June 1 
a Harvest is 3 weeks long and beginning and ending dates vary by year. 
 
eight crop years.  Harvest price is the average price received during the three week 
harvest period.  These average prices are weighted within each year by the number of 
bushels sold.  Percent of harvest sales is the percent of sales that occurred during the 
three week harvest, compared to sales for the whole year.  As can be seen from table II-2, 
producers at the southern elevator sell slightly more than half of their wheat at harvest.  
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This is likely due to the earlier harvest date at the southern elevator.  Producers may be 
trying to sell before the Kansas and Nebraska harvests begin and prices hit harvest lows.  
It is also interesting to note that harvest prices at the southern elevator are slightly higher 
than those at the other elevators, likely due to an earlier harvest.  The lowest prices are 
observed at the central elevator.  This is due to there being no competing elevator located 
close to the central elevator to force prices higher.  Both the southern and northern 
elevators must offer higher prices in order to compete with the other elevators located in 
their areas. 
Storage and interest costs were calculated for all elevators, as well as the USDA 
and USDA-like datasets.  The storage cost, set by the elevators, averages $0.00085 per 
day and $0.0255 per month.  Interest cost is calculated using the prime rate of the given 
year plus 2%.  The prime rate is based on the prime rate charged by banks in June of the 
given year and is quoted from the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank.  Daily interest 
costs at each elevator are calculated by multiplying the interest rate by the elevator’s 
average harvest price6 and dividing the product by 365 days.  The monthly interest cost 
for the USDA dataset is determined using the same method, except the product is divided 
by 12 months.  The cost of carry (storage cost plus interest cost) is then figured per day 
for the elevators and per month for the USDA datasets.  Storage and interest charges 
begin accumulating immediately after the three-week harvest period ends at each 
elevator.  Thus, the southern producers start accumulating storage and interest costs on 
June 15, the central producers start on June 25, and the northern producers start on July 1.   
                                                 
6 The average harvest price differs at each elevator due to the varying harvest dates. 
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The selling prices net of interest and storage at each elevator are 
(1) )
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kdktdk S
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daysPnetprice ++−=  
where t is the year, d is the day, k is the elevator, tdknetprice  is the net price, dkP  is the 
nominal price received on day d at elevator k, kdays is the number of days after harvest at 
elevator k, tkhp is the average harvest price at elevator k, tz is the prime interest rate for 
year t, and dkS is the storage cost per day.  The net prices for the USDA dataset are 
calculated using the following equation: 
(2) )
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where t is year, i is month, tinetprice is the net price, iP  is the monthly price received, 
mon is the number of months after harvest, thp  is the harvest price, tz  is the prime 
interest rate, and iS  is the monthly storage cost.  
 In order to compare returns to storage calculated with micro level data with 
returns calculated with aggregate data, the elevators’ daily prices must be converted to 
monthly prices.  This was done using a weighted average to calculate monthly prices 
across years for each elevator, where price was weighted within each year by the number 
of bushels sold.  Average harvest prices were then computed for each elevator, as well as 
the USDA data, based on the aforementioned harvest dates.  Monthly nominal returns to 
storage from harvest for each elevator and the USDA data are calculated using the 
following equation: 
(3) hrvstpricertrns ii −=  
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where rtrnsi is the returns to storage from harvest for month i, pricei is the nominal 
weighted-average price received per bushel for month i, and hrvst is the weighted-
average harvest price for each dataset.  For example, the returns to storage from harvest 
for the month of August at the northern elevator would equal the average August price 
minus the average harvest price ($3.35).  As previously discussed, the harvest price 
differs for each elevator, as well as for the USDA data.   
 The monthly net returns to storage from harvest for each elevator and the USDA 
dataset are determined such that 
(4) nethrvstnetpricenetrtrns ii −=  
where inetrtrns  is the net returns to storage from harvest for month i, netpricei is the net 
price for month i, and nethrvst is the average harvest net price.   
The micro level data were aggregated using the same aggregation method as the 
USDA.  The individual producer data were aggregated by month and year and weighted 
monthly averages were computed using the same method as that mentioned above.  Then, 
the bushel weighted monthly averages were aggregated by year in order to get an 
aggregate dataset similar to the USDA data set.  Monthly nominal returns to storage from 
harvest were calculated for the USDA-like data set using equation (3) and assuming the 
harvest price to be equal to the average June price.  Monthly net returns to storage from 
harvest were calculated using equations (2) and (4).  
The monthly returns to storage from harvest at each elevator were compared to 
the returns to storage from harvest calculated using the USDA data.  If the returns 
computed using the USDA data are notably less than the returns computed using the 
elevator data, then using aggregated data to determine returns to storage may result in 
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smaller returns than are actually the case.  It is also likely that using aggregate USDA 
data in storage research may result in an important loss of information.  
 Due to the fact that Oklahoma wheat producers typically sell the majority of their 
crop close to or at harvest, seasonality of wheat sales is also an important factor.  The 
frequency of sales in each month was calculated for each elevator, as well as for the 
USDA data using the following equation: 
(5) ∑=
i
i
i
i sales
sales
freq  
where freqi is equal to the percentage of total wheat sales that occurred in month i and 
salesi is equal to the total number of sales that occurred in month i.  Comparing the 
seasonality of wheat sales with returns to storage will allow us to observe whether 
producers continue to store their crop after price has reached its peak.     
 
Results 
 Figure II-1 graphs the monthly nominal returns to storage from harvest for each 
elevator, as well as the USDA dataset and the USDA-like dataset.  Figure II-2 graphs the 
monthly net returns to storage from harvest for each dataset.  Both graphs show that the 
returns calculated using the USDA data are not much different than the returns calculated 
using the micro level data. However, figure II-2 does show a slightly greater difference 
than figure II-1 between returns based on USDA data and returns based on elevator data.  
This difference is due to storage costs and the varying harvest dates at each elevator.  Due 
to the fact that harvest ends at different times for each elevator (typically around June 15 
in the south, June 25 at the central location, and July 1 in the north) producers at each  
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Figure II-1.  Nominal returns to storage from harvest 
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Figure II-2.  Net returns to storage from harvest 
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location start accumulating storage charges at different times.  For example, on July 5 the 
southern producers would have accumulated 20 days of storage charges, the central 
producers would have 10 days of storage charges, and the northern producers would only 
have five days of charges.  Despite the difference between figures II-1 and II-2, they both 
indicate that the USDA data only slightly underestimate the net returns to storage.  The 
USDA-like data closely resembles the actual USDA data, showing that the method used 
to aggregate the elevator data was consistent with the USDA method.  The similarity of 
the USDA-like dataset with that of the USDA dataset also indicates that the data 
collection process used by the USDA produces data that is consistent with actual elevator 
data. 
 As can be seen from figure II-2, negative net returns to storage are common.  One 
explanation for the negative returns is the presence of processor convenience yields7.  
Since processors receive a convenience yield from holding stores of commodities (i.e. 
wheat) used in the production of other commodities (i.e. flour), they will look to purchase 
contracts for future delivery.  If the price for the deferred delivery is below the harvest 
price, then negative returns to storage may arise.  Wright and Williams propose data 
aggregation as an explanation for negative returns to storage.  However, the results of the 
current study do not support this hypothesis.  Figure II-2 shows that negative returns to 
storage exist even when micro level data is used to calculate returns. 
Returns to storage are low close to harvest and start increasing around September, 
reaching their peak during November and December.  The negative returns during July 
and August are likely due to the beginning of the Kansas and Nebraska harvests.  One 
                                                 
7 Convenience yields are the implicit benefits that accrue to the owners of physical stocks (processors) but 
not to the owners of contracts for future delivery (producers) (Yoon and Brorsen). 
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possible explanation for prices falling off in late December/early January is the 
occurrence of two world harvests.  It is possible that due to the beginning of harvest in 
the southern-hemisphere the export demand for U.S. wheat decreases.  The domestic 
demand for U.S. wheat remains the same, but the available supply increases, driving 
down price.  While two world harvests is a plausible explanation, we were unable to find 
any seasonality in export shipment data.   
 Figure II-3 graphs the frequency of wheat sales by month at each elevator and for 
the USDA dataset. 
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Figure II-3.  Frequency of wheat sales by month 
 
As expected, the southern producers do most of their marketing at or very close to 
harvest.  The central and northern elevators also exhibit a high percentage of producer 
wheat sales during the harvest months of June and July.  This is fairly consistent with 
OSU extension recommendations that advise producers to use mechanical marketing 
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strategies, such as selling at harvest in the south and selling in lots of one-third on June 
20, October 15, and December 15 (Anderson and Brorsen).  The results show net prices 
are highest at harvest (figure II-2), indicating that producers should sell at harvest, 
regardless of location.  However, net returns for October and December are close to 
harvest returns at the central and northern elevators, showing some support for the one-
third marketing strategy8.  Prices peak around late November and early January (figures 
II-1 and II-2), so storing past these months would be uneconomical for producers.  The 
results in figure II-3 show that the majority of wheat sales occur before prices start 
declining in early February.  However, some wheat sales do take place during the more 
uneconomical time period of February to May9.  Producers may be exhibiting a 
psychological biasness known as the disposition effect (holding losing investments too 
long and selling winning investments too soon) which causes them to continue to store 
even though net returns are negative (Locke and Mann). 
 
Conclusions 
 This study is based on the belief that the aggregation of data can cause returns to 
storage to be underestimated by USDA data.  The objective was to determine how much 
USDA data underestimates the returns to storage compared to returns based on micro 
level data.  The results indicate that the use of USDA data only slightly underestimates 
net returns to storage and that the USDA data accurately reflects actual elevator 
transactions. Therefore, USDA data appear to be accurate and almost as reliable as micro 
level data. 
                                                 
8 This study uses fairly high interest rates.  Since many farmers have little or no debt, their opportunity cost 
is lower.  Thus, storage might provide a greater return than a bank checking or savings account. 
9 Due to its earlier harvest, the southern elevator does show increased sales in May. 
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 The seasonality of wheat sales was also addressed in the research.  Oklahoma 
wheat producers tend to sell close to harvest, likely due to an earlier harvest date which 
results in slightly higher harvest prices.  Prices peak around the end of November or 
beginning of January, which makes it uneconomical to continue to store past this point.  
However, some wheat sales do occur after prices have reached their peak.  This indicates 
that some producers do store their grain longer than is economical.  
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III.  
 
 
 
 
Essay III 
 
The Preference for Round Number Prices 
 
Introduction 
 
Recent empirical research indicates that not all prices are viewed as equal.  
Studies show that round prices (prices ending in zero or five) appear to be more popular 
than non-round prices in many financial markets, such as initial public offering markets, 
stock markets, and foreign exchange markets (Kandel, Sarig, and Wohl; Harris; Fischer).  
Technical analysts take this price clustering one step further by assessing its relationship 
to market trends.  Results of technical analysis suggest that trends tend to increase after 
certain prices levels (specifically round prices) are crossed (Osler; Aggarwal and Lucey).  
While there have been studies regarding price clustering at round numbers and its 
relationship to market trends in financial markets, there has been little done to address the 
possibility of round prices being preferred in non-financial markets.  Since psychological 
biases, such as price preference, may result in increased risks and unexpected outcomes 
(Kahneman and Riepe), it is important to research whether this particular bias exists in 
markets outside of the financial industry. 
The first objective of this paper is to determine if a preference for round prices 
exist within the Oklahoma wheat market.  Descriptive statistics will be used to test 
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whether round prices have a greater relative frequency than that of non-round prices.  If a 
preference for round prices exists it may suggest that producers are making marketing 
decisions based on psychological biases and further education on the consequences of 
these biased decisions may be required.  It is also possible that the preference for round 
prices is not coming from producers, but from the grain elevators.  Elevator managers 
could be using management practices that may influence price.     
The second objective relates to the technical analysis theory that market trends 
increase or decrease when round price thresholds are crossed.  Specifically, the objective 
is to determine whether whole dollar prices are viewed as round price thresholds.  This 
will be accomplished using a regression model that examines the change in number of 
market transactions (wheat sales) when price moves above or below a whole dollar 
amount. 
 
Theory 
If a preference for round prices in the Oklahoma wheat market does exists, it 
likely results from either management practices at the elevator level or psychological 
biasness on the part of the producer.  Management practices that could influence prices 
include such things as negotiated prices, adjusting margins to account for market 
uncertainties, and producer use of sell orders.  Producer psychological biasness simply 
indicates that producers may have an irrational inclination towards round prices. 
An overview of how elevators determine producer price is needed in order to 
better understand the possible causes of round price dominance in the Oklahoma wheat 
market.  Elevator managers typically determine producer price by subtracting their 
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margin to the market price that the elevator receives.  According to elevator managers, 
the margins they use to calculate producer price are usually based on historical margins 
and competitor prices and seldom change from year to year, though elevator managers 
may adjust the margin if significant changes in transportation costs occur.  Elevator 
managers do not round the price they receive from the market.  If rounding already exists 
in the market prices that elevators receive and elevator managers use round margins then 
producer price may be affected. However, elevator managers state that they do not 
usually set the margin at a round number. 
 Financial market research often attributes lower negotiation costs as one factor of 
price clustering at round numbers (Harris; Neiderhoffer).  If a producer met with an 
elevator manager in order to negotiate a better price, it is possible that there would be a 
tendency to round to the nearest five or ten cent increment.  Interviews with elevator 
managers indicate that prices are very seldom negotiated; however, if price is negotiated 
rounding to the nearest five or ten cent increment typically occurs.  Since, negotiated 
prices are very rare it is unlikely that this would result in a prevalence of round prices.  
As for elevator managers adjusting margins to account for market uncertainties, managers 
report that margins are only adjusted for changes in transportation and even then the 
adjustment is slight.  Therefore, it is also unlikely that this would cause round prices to be 
more dominant. 
  The most likely cause of any round number pricing in the wheat market is 
producers’ use of sell orders that are placed at round prices.  According to elevator 
managers, sell orders are a common wheat marketing tool (Smith).  Sell orders are placed 
by the producer and give the elevator manager permission to sell a given amount of the 
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stored crop when price reaches a certain level (Osler).  The agreed upon sell price is 
known as the target price.  Evidence from sell orders in the currency and stock markets 
indicate that target prices are commonly set at round prices (Harris; Osler; Fischer).  
Elevator managers agree that target prices on sell orders are almost always set at round 
prices (Smith).   
The preference for setting target prices at round numbers is often attributed to the 
memory-economizing tendencies of individuals (Kahn, Pennachi, and Sopranzetti).  
Individuals tend to be better able to remember round numbers which results in a 
preference for round prices.  Even elevator managers say that producers seem to be more 
“round number minded”.  This preference for round prices is an example of a 
psychological bias.  Research in behavioral finance indicates that people may 
unknowingly incorporate certain psychological biases (errors in intuitive judgment) into 
their decision-making process (Kahneman and Riepe; Odean).  Evidence of 
psychological biases have been found in both the financial and agricultural markets and 
include such things as overconfidence in the ability to predict the future, maintaining 
losing market positions, and remembering successes and forgetting failures (Brorsen and 
Anderson; Kahneman and Riepe; Odean).  If producers do have a psychological 
inclination towards round numbers, it could very well cause round prices to occur more 
frequently. 
 
Data 
 Data are from three grain elevators located in the northern, southern, and central 
areas of western Oklahoma.  The data span nine crop years, from the harvest of 1992 
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through the harvest of 2000, and contain individual producer transactions of wheat sales 
at each elevator.  Each transaction includes the number of bushels sold, price per bushel, 
date of transaction, and the number of weeks after harvest that the transaction took place.  
Harvest is a four week period that is defined differently for each elevator depending on 
location.  Beginning harvest dates for the southern, central, and northern elevators are 
May 25, June 1, and June 12 respectively.   
Table III-1 contains the descriptive statistics for each elevator.  Average price is 
the nominal average price that producers received over the nine years of data.  The 
average week after harvest is the average week that producers chose to market their 
wheat for all years.  Percent round number prices is the percent of individual daily prices 
that are round numbers (prices that end in zero).  
Table III-1.  Descriptive Statistics for Each Elevator 
Descriptive Statistics  South Central North 
Average price ($/bu.)  3.41 3.32 3.38 
Average week  5 16 18 
Percent round number prices  15.39% 12.37% 11.65% 
Number of observations  14434 7089 6389 
 
The southern elevator has the highest price and lowest average number of weeks.  
According to Benirschka and Binkley, locations closer to the market (the Gulf) typically 
have higher negative returns to storage than locations further away from the market.  
Therefore, southern producers are more likely to sell at or close to harvest which results 
in a lower average number of weeks after harvest compared to the central and northern 
elevators.  The higher average price at the southern elevator is likely due to the fact that 
the southern elevator is closer to the market (the Gulf), thus transportation costs are 
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lower.  Therefore, the average price is higher at the southern elevator.  Another reason for 
the higher average price could be that harvest is slightly earlier at the southern elevator 
resulting in a slightly higher demand for wheat and a higher price per bushel.   
 
Procedures 
 The procedures include descriptive statistics and regression analysis.  The 
descriptive statistics are used to determine if round prices are more prevalent than non-
round prices in the Oklahoma wheat market.  The regression model assesses whether 
producers use whole dollar prices as threshold levels by estimating how the number of 
daily transactions changes when prices move above or below whole dollar prices. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 In order to study the prevalence of round prices, descriptive statistics are 
computed and tested using methods like that of Kandel, Sarig, and Wohl and Osler.  First, 
Tjd is computed, where Tjd is equal to the total number of transactions for each elevator j 
that occurred at each last digit d (d = 0,1,…,9).  Then the relative frequency of 
transactions occurring at each last digit is determined using the following equation: 
(1) ∑=
d
jd
jd
jd T
T
R  
where Rjd is equal to the percentage of the total number of transactions at elevator j at 
prices that end with the last digit d.  The null hypothesis is that round prices are not more 
prevalent than non-round prices.  A chi-squared test for equal proportions is performed to 
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determine whether a significant difference exists between the frequencies occurring at 
each last digit.     
 
Regression Model 
 
 For the purpose of running the regression model the individual data were 
aggregated by day for each elevator, so that each observation contains the daily number 
of transactions, daily price per bushel, date, and number of weeks after harvest.  The 
following regression is used to determine the effect of prices moving above or below 
whole dollar prices on the number of daily transactions: 
(2) ittiittiititit
k
ktkit blwblwabvabvwahwahcytr εββββββββ ++++++++= −−
=
∑ ,176,1542328
1
10  
where i is the day, t is the year, trit is the number of transactions that occurred on the ith 
day in year t, cyt is a dummy variable for each crop year, wahit is the yearly bushel-
weighted mean weeks after harvest when wheat was sold, itabv  is a dummy variable for 
the movement of price above a whole dollar value, tiabv ,1−  is the lagged movement of 
price above a whole dollar value, itblw  is a dummy variable for the movement of price 
below a whole dollar value, tiblw ,1−  is the lagged movement of price below a whole dollar 
value, and itε  is the error term.  The plots of error terms versus wahit for the OLS model 
exhibited heteroskedasticity with variance increasing for low values of wahit, thus the 
regression is estimated using maximum likelihood.  The error, itε , is defined to be 
heteroskedastic as 
(3) ),0(~ 2itit N σε   
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and the variance of )( 2itit σε is defined as 
(4) )exp( 2210
2
ititit wahwah ααασ ++= .  
 It is expected that transactions will increase when price moves above a whole 
dollar value, therefore, 4β  and 5β  are expected to be positive.  Conversely, transactions 
are expected to decrease when price moves below a whole dollar value, thus 6β  and 7β  
are expected to be negative.  Oklahoma producers typically sell the majority of their crop 
at or close to harvest.  Therefore, as weeks after harvest increase fewer transactions are 
expected and 2β  is expected to be negative. 
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
  
Figures III-1, III-2, and III-3 show the histograms for the relative frequency of 
transactions at the northern, central, and southern elevators for each possible last digit in 
price.   
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Figure III-1.  Histogram of last digit in price for northern elevator 
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Figure III-2.  Histogram of last digit in price for central elevator 
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Figure III-3.  Histogram of last digit in price for southern elevator 
 
As expected more transactions take place at prices with a last digit of zero.  For the chi-
squared equal proportion test, the null hypothesis that the frequency of transactions is 
equally distributed across all last digits was rejected at all locations.  The frequency of 
occurrence across last digits is more evenly distributed in the northern and central 
elevators than at the southern elevator.  The southern elevator has the highest percentage 
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of transactions occurring at zero with almost 16% and has a high percentage of 
transactions occurring with a last digit of seven.   
As expected, the results indicate that there is a preference for round prices in the 
Oklahoma wheat market.  However, the preference found in this study is fairly small 
compared to that found in studies of financial markets.  It is possible that producer 
biasness leads to the placing of a disproportional amount of sell orders at round prices 
which, then leads to a prevalence of round prices in the wheat market.       
 
Regression Model 
 
The results of the regression of number of transactions with respect to price 
movement above or below a whole dollar amount are shown in table III-2.  The results of 
the regression analysis show that the coefficients for the movement of price above a 
whole dollar amount and for the lagged movement of price above a whole dollar amount 
exhibit the expected positive sign and are significant.  This indicates that as price moves 
beyond a whole dollar amount, the number of transactions increase.  This could be 
interpreted as producers using whole dollar prices as threshold levels and selling when 
price moves across that threshold.  For example, if price increases from $2.88 to $3.02 it 
would cross the $3.00 threshold and producers would increase their wheat sales (i.e. more 
transactions would occur).  The coefficients for the movement of price below a whole 
dollar amount and for the lagged movement of price below a whole dollar amount are not 
significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level, which suggests that price 
movement below a whole dollar amount does not significantly affect producers’ 
decisions to sell their wheat.  These results coincide with the results of technical analysis 
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that show market trends (wheat sales) increasing after specific price levels (whole dollar 
prices) are crossed.      
Table III-2.  Regression of Whole Dollar Prices on Number of Transactions  
 Estimate t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 5.5121 10.08 <.0001 
1993 crop year .1097 .38 .7023 
1994 crop year -.1450 -.63 .5254 
1995 crop year .3894 1.64 .1011 
1996 crop year .3935 1.64 .1017 
1997 crop year .7004 2.27 .0235 
1998 crop year .6370 1.82 .0692 
1999 crop year .4552 1.90 .0570 
2000 crop year .3915 1.67 .0947 
Weeks after harvest (wah) -.1507* -4.38 <.0001 
Weeks after harvest squared (wah2) .001727* 2.99 .0028 
Movement above whole price (abv) .8041* 2.04 .0416 
Lagged movement above whole price ( 1−iabv ) 1.3278* 3.00 .0027 
Movement below whole price (blw) -.4029 -1.75 .0806 
Lagged movement below whole price ( 1−iblw ) .3601 1.16 .2441 
* Indicates significance at 95% confidence level 
 
 
Conclusion 
 This study determined whether round prices are more common in the Oklahoma 
wheat market.  The results show that round prices are slightly more common than non-
round prices at all three elevator locations.  This is likely due to producers using sell 
orders with a majority of the target prices set at round numbers.  This inclination towards 
round numbers could be the result of producer psychological biases.  If producers allow 
psychological biases to influence their marketing decisions then they may experience 
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lower returns and unexpected outcomes.  Therefore, additional steps may be required in 
order to educate producers about the psychological mistakes that they are prone to make.   
Regression analysis was used to determine the effect of movements around 
specific price thresholds on wheat sales.  The test showed that wheat sales increased 
slightly when price moved above a whole dollar amount, while the effect of price 
movement below a whole dollar amount was not statistically significant.  These results 
indicate that producers may be using whole number prices as threshold levels, waiting to 
sell after price moves above these thresholds.   
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